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I. INTRODUCTION

In this, the centennial year of Roscoe Pound's 1906 address to the
American Bar Association ("ABA"), I will first contextualize the
Pound speech with an eye toward its role in inaugurating a good
government movement spanning the twentieth century that sought to
regulate the judiciary with explicit reference to preserving public trust
and confidence in the courts. Second, I will describe more recent
developments growing out of the civil liberties movement that have
put the future of the good government movement in doubt by calling
into question the constitutionality of provisions in state codes of
judicial conduct that seek to promote public confidence in the courts
by prohibiting judicial speech and association that creates the
appearance of impropriety or partiality. Third, I will discuss the
disqualification regime that some reformers have proposed as an
antidote, wherein judges are permitted-and perhaps even
encouraged-to speak their minds freely, as long as they disqualify
themselves later from hearing cases in which their prior statements
call their impartiality into question. I conclude that for a
disqualification regime to be effective, we must return to the roots of
Roscoe Pound's good government movement and the informal norms
" John F. Kimberling Chair in Law, Indiana University School of Law at
Bloomington. I would like to thank Dean James Alfini for inviting me to participate in the
symposium at South Texas College of Law where the paper giving rise to this article was
presented. Thanks likewise to Ben Ellis for his research assistance.
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that have long discouraged judges from publicly venting their spleens
on every hot legal topic of the day. If the judiciary succeeds in
conserving the longstanding norms that encourage judges to watch
what they say and with whom they associate (even if they have a
"right" to do otherwise) to the end of promoting public confidence in
the courts-then disqualification is a viable means to remedy isolated
deviations from the norm.

II. ROSCOE POUND AND THE GOOD GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT
The progressive era featured a collision between two
fundamentally different ways of looking at the world. The
progressives were troubled by the impact of industrialization on
working-class America.' They sought to by-pass the laissez faire
penchants of the legal establishment generally, and courts in
particular, by circumventing the common law that had regulated
workplace relationships as a matter of private contract and electing
state legislatures that sought to regulate hours, wages, and working
conditions by statute.2
The conservative legal establishment was deeply suspicious of
regulation by what it regarded as the rabble and used the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to fight back.3 As emblemized
by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New
York, conservative judges at the state and federal level closely
scrutinized progressive state statutes regulating the workplace and
invalidated those that struck them as excessive on the theory that
unreasonable interference with the freedom of contract deprived
businesses of a property right without due process of law, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 4
Progressives reacted to the Lochner era courts with what William

WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
1.
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, 12 (1994).
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J.
2309, 2311 (1995) (book review).

3. See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function
of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1267 n.47 (2004) (describing conservative
efforts to curb "unrestrained democracy" during the Progressive era by defending the

Supreme Court's substantive due process decisions, which protected the "economic
liberties" of the minority from majority rule).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905). The Lochner court found that a
New York law limiting bakery employees to a sixty-hour work-week was an
unconstitutional interference with the right to contract as guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id.
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Ross characterizes as a "muted fury." 5 Senator George Norris
declared that federal judges on the trial and appellate levels "were
'not responsive to the pulsations of humanity [because] the security of
a life position and a life salary makes them forget too often the toiling
masses who are struggling for an existence.""' Members of Congress
railed against judges who interfered with the progressives' legislative
agenda. They introduced constitutional amendments to end life tenure
for federal judges and to select federal judges by popular election.
They also sought to strip what they regarded as "business-friendly
federal courts" of jurisdiction to hear commercial cases.'
At the state level, Progressives lobbied for an end to judicial
review and for the institution of recall procedures whereby the
electorate could remove rogue judges.9 Illustrative of the depth of
feeling that surrounded the Progressive Era assault on the courts was
the fracas that arose over Arizona's admission to the Union in 1911.
In its petition for statehood, Arizona's draft Constitution included a
provision for recall of elected officials, including judges.")
Conservative President and later Chief Justice William Howard Taft
would have none of it: Judicial recall was "so pernicious in its effect,
so destructive of independence in the judiciary, so likely to subject the
rights of the individual to the possible tyranny of a popular majority,
and, therefore, to be so injurious to the cause of free government"
that he could not approve of a constitution with such a provision."
Taft successfully blocked Arizona's petition and conditioned its
admission to the Union on it excluding judges from the scope of the
recall provisions in its proposed constitution.' 2 Arizona obliged and
was admitted into the Union, whereupon it promptly reinstated
judicial recall in 1912."3
In short, court-directed anger had reached a high-water mark
during the Progressive era. It was in the middle of this political
maelstrom that Roscoe Pound appeared on the national stage in 1906.
5. See ROSS, supra note 1, at 2, 20.
6. PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
17-18 (1973) (alteration in original).
7.
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 95 (2006).

8.
9.
10.

See id. at 95-96.
ROSS, supra note 1, at 48.
JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVIVED

106 (1986).
Id. (quoting 47 CONG. REC. 3964 (1911)).
1t.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 106-07.
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Pound was a relatively obscure, thirty-seven-year old lawyer turned
botanist, who, after an unhappy stint in private practice, found his way
onto the faculty of the University of Nebraska Law School in 1899
before becoming the law school's dean four years later. 14 As luck
would have it, the ABA president had heard Dean Pound speak to the
Nebraska Bar Association the previous year and extended an
invitation for him to address the ABA at its 1906 annual meeting on
the subject of the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice."
John Wigmore would later characterize Pound's speech as "[t]he
spark that kindled the white flame of progress." 6 The casual reader,
however, who evaluates the address in isolation and through a 21st
century lens, can be forgiven for thinking that Wigmore had read the
wrong speech or otherwise lost his mind. By 21st century standards,
there is nothing special about someone within the ABA standing up
and giving a speech on what ails the judiciary; to the contrary, it is
business as usual.17 This one was written in workmanlike but largely
uninspiring prose. Pound slogged his way through four causes and
twenty-one sub-causes of anti-court sentiment with the zeal of a
botanist taxonomizing fungi-hardly the stuff of a riveting keynote
address. And the address, while replete with divisions and
subdivisions, was nonetheless oddly organized. Causes and sub-causes
bled into each other. And of the four primary causes of dissatisfaction
Pound identifies, three, he concluded, could not be helped because
they were inherent in any legal system, our legal system, or the
14. Barry Friedman, Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice: A
Retrospective (and Look Ahead), IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).

15.

Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of

Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906).
16. John H. Wigmore, The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of Progress-Pound's
St. PaulAddress of 1906, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 50, 50 (1962).

17.

For example, three recent ABA projects with which I was affiliated, include:

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 46 (1997)

(exploring the "potentially serious problems" for judicial independence posed by "a
number of departures from the 'spirit of restraint' that should dominate the interbranch
relationship" between courts and Congress); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC
FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1 (2002) (characterizing "the nature and cost of
running for the bench" as "one of the more pervasive problems" posing "threats to judicial
independence," which has contributed to the "erosion of public trust and confidence" in
the judiciary); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 13

(2003) (reporting, as the title implies, that the administration of justice has been
jeopardized by recent developments).
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current political environment; yet, Pound organized his talk so that
the one cause which could be remedied-dissatisfaction with judicial
organization and procedure-was addressed third, leaving him to
close by discussing problems with the current political environment
that he deemed impossible to remedy, thereby ending not with a bang,
but a whimper."
To appreciate the true greatness of Pound's address to the ABA,
the speech must be understood in context. As Barry Friedman
observes, "Pound was hardly a firebrand."' 9 He was a part of the legal
establishment that had invited him to Minneapolis in the summer of
1906-the son of a lawyer and judge, and a Harvard educated lawyer,
professor and dean in his own right." He shared the establishment's
distaste for "the crude and unorganized character of American
legislation in a period when the growing point of law has drifted to
legislation., 21 He professed no quarrel with the Lochner Court's
dismissive treatment of such legislation: "I do not criticize these
decisions," he declared. "As the law stands, I do not doubt they were
rightly determined."2 2 And he had no patience for progressive
proposals to control judges or the substance of judicial decisions. 3
In short, Pound was himself an insider speaking to a group of
insiders who looked upon the progressives' ongoing assault on the
courts with disdain. Against this backdrop, Pound's opening statement
that "we must not be deceived ... into overlooking or underrating the
real and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law
which exists in the United States to-day," must have landed like a
bucket of ice water to the face. 24 "Courts are distrusted," he
continued, and he attributed the development in part to "public
ignorance of the real workings of courts due to ignorant and
sensational reports in the press" and to "[p]utting courts into politics,"
25
which "has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.,
That Pound openly acknowledged widespread disaffection with
the judiciary and identified it as a serious problem warranting
attention and reform was what mattered. By today's standards,
Pound's observations seem utterly unremarkable: concern for flagging

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See generally Pound, supra note 15, at 729-49.
Friedman, supra note 14.
Id.
Pound, supra note 15, at 748.
Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 20 (1906).
See FISH, supra note 6, at 19.
Pound, supra note 15, at 730.
Id. at 729. 734.
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public confidence in the courts dominates contemporary discourse on
the administration of justice. It bears emphasis, however, that our
ongoing obsession with how the courts are perceived or respected by
the public at large began with Pound and his era.26
The immediate impact of Pound's address on his audience, Dean
John Wigmore would later report, was stunned irritation and anger.27
The long-term impact of Pound's address on the nation was no less
stunning, for it catalyzed the emergence of the modern 20th century
judiciary.
Pound's speech provided an impetus for establishing the
American Judicature Society; 2 it encouraged the proliferation of
specialized courts;29 it began a century-long movement toward the
establishment and encouragement of alternative dispute resolution
techniques; 3° it led to the establishment of the American Law Institute
and the Restatements of law;31 it fueled the drive for uniform rules of
practice and procedure;3 2 it called for structural reforms that
culminated in the establishment of judicial councils, judicial
conferences, and administrative offices of courts;3 3 and it catalyzed
26. See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts
in an Age of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH-PRESS: THE COLLISION
OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA (Keith J. Bybee ed., forthcoming 2007)
(explaining the evolution of the public's perception of the courts).
27. Wigmore, supra note 16, at 52.
28. Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74
JUDICATURE 128, 128 (1990) ("While that speech alone may not have been sufficient to
prompt... [the establishment of] the American Judicature Society... there is no doubt
that ...[it] played a significant role along with other factors then present.").
29. Rekha Mirchandani, What's So Special About Specialized Courts? The State and
Social Change in Salt Lake City's Domestic Violence Court, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 379, 382
(2005) ("As a result [of Pound's speech], the American Judicature Society began to push
for specialized courts.").
30. Frances E. Zollers, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Product Liability Reform,
26 AM. BUS. L.J. 479, 480 (1988) ("Roscoe Pound was an early proponent of seeking
alternatives to full adjudication of disputes.") (citing Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice,29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 395 (1906)).
31. Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the
Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1313 n.94 (2003) ("This particular drive
to bring order to perceived chaos in the decisional law [by means of the Restatements] has
been traced to Dean Roscoe Pound's influential speech to the ABA in 1906 ....).
32. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 514 n.4
(2006) (noting that the Advisory Committee established by the U.S. Supreme Court under
the Rules Enabling Act followed Pound's recommendation precisely).
33. David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A StatisticalAnalysis of Federal
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S.CAL. L. REV. 65, 148-49 (1981) ("Roscoe
Pound's speech in 1906 ... set the tone for the Progressive Era's structural and
administrative reform of the federal courts.") (citing Pound, supra note 15, at 742 (noting
that the court system is archaic and consequently judicial power is wasted)).
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projects to develop the canons of professional ethics and later the
canons of judicial ethics." I want to return to one consequence of
Pound's speech that is worthy of special mention: his focus on the
importance of public confidence in the courts. Public confidence is a
matter of appearance or perception-to preserve public confidence in
the courts, it is not enough that judges behave well-the public must
perceive them to behave well too.
Prior to Pound's address, the issue of public trust and confidence
in the courts, while not altogether absent from public discussion,
maintained a decidedly low profile.35 Prior to the 20th century, the
only real opportunities to evaluate and address judicial conduct arose
in the context of judicial removal proceedings: impeachment,
legislative address, and automatic removal upon conviction of
specified crimes. 36 It is thus understandable that bribery, corruption,
and other misconduct gross enough to warrant removal monopolized
attention, while appearance problems received short shrift. Pound
elevated the profile of appearance problems considerably by justifying
his reform agenda with explicit reference to flagging public respect for
judges and the judiciary.37 In this respect, Pound's talk signaled what I
have called "The appearance of appearances."38 Indeed,
Pound's
address gave rise to a newfound preoccupation with public confidence
in the courts that culminated in the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics.39
Canon 4 declared that judges' conduct should be "free from.., the
appearance of impropriety., 40 In Canon 19, judges were advised to
explain the basis for their rulings so as to "avoid[] the suspicion of
arbitrary conclusion [and] promote[] confidence in [their] intellectual
integrity., 41 Canon 24 instructed judges to avoid obligations that
would "appear to interfere with [their] devotion to the expeditious
and proper administration of [their] official functions. 42 Canon 25
admonished judges against causing "any reasonable suspicion that

34.

JEFFREY SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS vi (3d ed. 2000)

("The first call in [the 20th] century for formalized standards of professional conduct in the
legal profession came in 1906 in Roscoe Pound's speech 'The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice."').

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
10-13.

Geyh, supra note 26, at 7-8.
Id. at 6-7.
See Pound, supra note 15, at 730.
Geyh, supra note 26, at 6.
See generally CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924); see Geyh, supra note 26, at

40.

CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS pmbl. (1924).

41.
42.

Id. at Canon 19.
Id. at Canon 24.
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[they are] utilizing the power or prestige of [their] office to [advance
private interests]. ' 3 Canon 26 told judges to avoid relationships that
could "arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias [their]
judgment."" Canon 27 directed judges not to hold fiduciary positions
that could "seem to interfere with the proper performance of [their]
judicial duties., 45 Canon 28 told judges to forego political activities6
that could arouse the "suspicion of being warped by political bias."
Canon 30 warned judicial candidates not "to create the impression
that if chosen, [they] will administer [their] office with bias, partiality
or improper discrimination. 4 7 Canon 31, which applied where judges
were authorized to practice law part-time, stated that judges should
not "seem[] to utilize [their] judicial position to further [their]
professional success." ' In Canon 33, judges were counseled to
sidestep conduct that might "awaken the suspicion that [their] social
or business relations or friendships, constitute an element in
influencing [their] judicial conduct."49 Canon 34 declared in sweeping
terms that, "[i]n every particular[, a judge's] conduct should be above
reproach."5 ° And Canon 35 observed that broadcasting court
proceedings "create[s] misconceptions... in the mind of the public
and should not be permitted."'"
The canons of professional ethics remained in place until the
1970s when the Vietnam War and Watergate gave rise to a new crisis
of confidence in the institutions of government, and Congressional
investigations into the conduct of Justices Abe Fortas and William 0.
Douglas, coupled with a wave of disenchantment with the Warren
Court, moved the ABA to craft a new Code of Judicial Conduct. 2
Whereas the Canons of Judicial Ethics had been hortatory
pronouncements that judges were free to follow or not, the 1972
Code's preamble declared that the Code was intended to establish
mandatory standards that new state judicial conduct commissions and

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at Canon 25.
Id. at Canon 26.
Id. at Canon 27.
Id. at Canon 28.
Id. at Canon 30.
Id. at Canon 31.
Id. at Canon 33.
Id. at Canon 34.

51. Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Periland
the Promise,49 DUKE L.J. 147, 201 n.183 (1999).

52. See Whitney North Seymour, The Code of Judicial Conduct from the Point of
View of a Member of the Bar, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 352, 352 (1972).
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their respective supreme courts would be charged with enforcing."
The 1972 Code thus effectively strengthened the commitment to
regulating appearances as a means to promote public confidence in
the courts by making its rules enforceable. Provisions regulating
appearances remained an important part of the 1972 Code. As with
Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 2 of the new Code
provided judges "should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all [their] activities. 54 Canon 2A declared that judges
should act "at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.""5 Canon 2B stated
that judges should not "convey the impression" that they are subject
to outside influence. 6 Canon 3C provided that judges should
disqualify themselves from hearing cases in which their "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. 5 7 Canon 4 allowed judges to
participate in quasi-judicial activities as long as in so doing they did
not "cast doubt on [their] capacity to decide [matters] impartially."58
Canon 5A limited extra-judicial activities to those that "do not detract
from the dignity" of judicial office.5 9 Canons 5B and 5C(1) limited a
judge's civic, charitable, and financial activities to those that do not
"reflect adversely" on the judge's impartiality.' Canon 6 permitted
judges to receive compensation or reimbursement for extrajudicial
activities only if it did not "give the appearance of influencing the
judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of
impropriety.",6' Last, Canon 7B(1)(a) provided that judicial candidates
"should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office." 62
In 1990, the ABA revised its Model Code again, and went further
still to underscore the mandatory nature of its provisions by replacing
the "shoulds" of the 1972 Code with "shalls."63 The 1990 Code
retained some of the same appearance-promoting provisions as its
1972 predecessor, 6' but it added others: Canon 2C prohibited judges
53. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 110 (1972).
54. Id. at Canon 2.
55. Id. at Canon 2A.
56. Id. at Canon 2B.
57. Id. at Canon 3C.
58. Id. at Canon 4.
59. Id. at Canon 5A.
60. Id. at Canon 5B, 5C(1).
61. Id. at Canon 6.
62. Id. at Canon 7B(1)(a).
63. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990), with MODEL
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
64.

CODE OF

See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990). "A judge shall

avoid.., the appearance of impropriety .

Id. at Canon 2. "A judge ... shall act at all
I..."
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from being members in discriminatory organizations, on the theory
that judges who belong to clubs that exclude, say, women or racial or
ethnic minorities, create the perception that they approve of such
policies. 6 Canon 3B(5) not only instructed judges to perform their
duties without bias or prejudice but also directed them not to
"manifest bias or prejudice" by their words or conduct. 6 Canon 4D(1)
and 1(a) provided that judges must not engage in business dealings
that "may reasonably be perceived to exploit" their judicial position.67
Canon 4D(5)(b) directed judges to frge family members not to accept
gifts that could "reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the
judge. '" '
One change implemented in the 1990 Code warrants special
mention. The 1972 Code included the so-called "announce clause,"
which forbade judges qua judicial candidates from "announc[ing their]
views on disputed legal or political issues."6 9 The drafters of the 1990
Code deemed the announce clause to be unnecessarily vague and
replaced it with provisions that barred judges from making
commitments, pledges, or promises. 70 At first blush, clauses barring
judges from making promises or commitments to decide specific issues
in particular ways would seem calculated to preserve the reality of
judicial impartiality, but a closer look reveals that they too are
appearance-promoting. In reality, the judge who promises to decide x
case in y way remains impartial as long as she stands ready to honor
her oath of office and abandon her promise at the point of decisioneven though it appears as though the promise has compromised her
impartiality.
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in... the judiciary." Id. at Canon 2A.
"A judge shall not convey the impression that [others] are in a special position to influence
the judge." Id. at Canon 2B. Judges must disqualify themselves from proceedings in which
their impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Id. at Canon 3E. A judge's
extrajudicial activities must not "cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act
impartially." Id. at Canon 4A(1). Candidates for judicial office "shall maintain the dignity
appropriate to judicial office." Id. at Canon'5A(3)(a).
65. Id. at Canon 2C.
66. Id. at Canon 3B(5).
67. Id. at Canon 4D(1), 1(a).
68. Id. at Canon 4D(5)(b).
69.
70.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1), 1(c) (1972).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990). Subsection (i)

prohibits "pledges or promises of conduct" and subsection (ii) prohibits "mak[ing]
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." Id. at Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii). The commentary on this section best highlights the challenges encountered by the
drafters as they sought to balance political free speech and judicial impartiality. Id. at
Canon 5A(3)(d) cmt.
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III. REPUBLICANPARTY OFMINNESOTA V. WHITE" AND THE CIVIL
LIBERTIES MOVEMENT

The problem with enforcing a code of conduct designed to
promote public confidence in the courts by preserving the appearance
of judicial propriety is that the appearances a judge creates are often
derived from what she says or with whom she associates. The rules
thus restrict a judge's speech. And governmental restrictions on the
content of a judge's speech put the good government movement that
Roscoe Pound founded on a collision course with the civil liberties
movement that had been growing in strength and size since the middle
of the 20th century.
Enter the U.S. Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, decided in 2002.72 White evaluated Minnesota's version of the
1972 Model Code's announce clause. 73 After ruling that state-imposed
restrictions on the content of judicial speech are subject to strict
scrutiny, the Court invalidated the announce clause and held that
judges have a First Amendment right to take positions on issues that
may come before them. In elective systems, the Court reasoned,
voters need to know what the election is about, and no legitimate
purpose is served by keeping them in the dark.7 5 The argument that
the announce clause preserved judicial impartiality was rejected on
the grounds that the clause was under-inclusive because it forbade
judges from announcing their positions as candidates but not at other
times-which led the majority to conclude that the true purpose of the
clause was to
undermine judicial elections rather than to preserve
76
impartiality.
White dropped a stone in the regulatory pond, and in the
aftermath, academicians and practitioners have studied the ripples
without consensus as to when or where they will dissipate.7 White
arose in the context of a state-imposed restriction on judicial
campaign speech, and perhaps its reach will be limited to that context
71.
72.

536 U.S. 765, 765 (2002) (5-4 decision).
Id.

73.

Id. at 774-76; MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).

74. White, 536 U.S. at 774-76.
75. Id. at 788 ("[T]he First Amendment does not permit [the opposition of judicial
elections] by leaving the principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from
discussing what the elections are about.").
76. Id. at 782.
77. Alexandrea Haskell Young, Note, The First Chink in the Armor? The
Constitutionality of State Laws Burdening Judicial Candidates After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 434 (2004) (discussing the uncertain
implications of White).

[Vol. 48:871
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on the theory that there, and only there, the unfettered right of judges
to utter uniquely political speech, when coupled with the electorate's
right to receive election-related information, justifies a freedom so
nearly absolute as to trump any state interest in suppression-which
was the point of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in White.8 Consistent
with this view, most of the lower court cases that have invalidated
code of conduct restrictions on judicial speech in the aftermath of
White have concerned judicial campaign speech and association. 9 If
this view wins the day, then other code-based restrictions on a judge's
speech and association outside of judicial campaigns may remain
beyond White's reach.
On the other hand, the implications of White are not necessarily
confined to judicial elections. Any state-imposed restriction on the
content of a judge's speech is presumably subject to strict scrutiny.
The Court's skepticism of the state's justification for suppression of
the speech at issue in White is consistent with its skepticism of
content-based restrictions on speech in other contexts. 80 White may
represent the tip of an iceberg that will gradually force the
deregulation of judicial speech and association generally. In 2005, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi took a step in this direction.
In Mississippi Commission on JudicialPerformance v. Wilkerson,
the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a judge had a First
Amendment right to write a letter to his local paper urging that
homosexuals be institutionalized rather than afforded equal rights.8 '
The state's disciplinary commission had ruled that the judge's letter
violated his obligation under the Code of Conduct to "conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,"' but the court ruled that
after White, such an application of the "act at all times" clause
violated the judge's First Amendment right to free speech.83 The court
78. White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This case does not present the
question whether a State may restrict the speech of judges because they are judges-for
example, as part of a code of judicial conduct; the law at issue here regulates judges only
when and because they are candidates.").
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LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1130 (2d ed. 1988).

81. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1008, 101415 (Miss. 2004).
82. Id. at 1010 (quoting the MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A)
(1995)).
83. Id. at 1016.
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went out of its way to underscore its view that the State had no
compelling interest in preserving the appearance of judicial
impartiality. To the contrary, the court reasoned, the state had no
interest whatsoever in making a biased judge appear impartial:
"forcing . . . judges to conceal their prejudice" would simply
undermine "the more compelling state interest of providing an
impartial court for all litigants" by denying unsuspecting gay and
lesbian litigants the information they needed to expose the judge's
bias and formulate a motion to disqualify the judge from hearing their
84
cases.
Undeniably, White and its progeny are moving the law in a new
direction. Just as undeniably, and perhaps even more importantly,
they are abandoning the value structure of the good government
movement that Pound inaugurated a century ago in favor of the newer
value structure of the civil liberties movement. In Wilkerson and
White, the unstated implication was that extrajudicial position taking
on issues of the day should not merely be tolerated but celebrated as
an important means to inform voters and litigants. The First
Amendment operates on the assumption that more speech is better
than less, and that little is gained by suppressing speech and forcing
the public to remain in the dark. If judges are discourteous, biased,
undignified, dependant, or prejudiced, a logical extension of the
argument would go, then the First Amendment dictates that it is
better for us to know about it than for the state to preserve, through a
system of mandatory restrictions on judicial speech and association,
the appearance that judges are otherwise. The ultimate paradox, then,
may be that reforms aimed at strengthening the Code of Conduct's
commitment to eradicating appearance problems, by making rules
against creating such problems more enforceable, have had the
opposite effect of exposing those rules to constitutional challenge and
thereby weakening them. The net effect, I have argued elsewhere, is
the possible disappearance of appearances."
IV. THE DISQUALIFICATION REGIME

As a fallback remedy, reformers have looked toward
disqualification; judges may now have a right to speak or associate as
they choose, but if they do so in ways that compromise their apparent
impartiality to decide future cases, they can be required to disqualify

84.
85.

Id. at 1015.
See Geyh, supra note 26, at 37.
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themselves later from hearing those cases.86 The Code of Conduct has
long provided that judges must disqualify themselves from hearing
cases in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and
more recently, the ABA has added specific new grounds for
disqualification where judges make prior statements that "appear" to
commit them to deciding cases in particular ways or where judges
create appearance problems by accepting campaign contributions
from litigants or lawyers in excess of specified amounts.87
And so, the sun may be rising on a brave new world of judicial
speech, in which judges are permitted and perhaps encouraged to vent
their spleens on the issues of the day for the benefit of voters and
litigants. The appearance problems such position taking creates can be
ameliorated, the argument goes, by disqualification. Such a regime
tolerates, if not fosters, the perception that the judiciary is populated
with outspoken, biased judges but seeks to qualify that perception by
assuring litigants that the biases publicly cultivated by the judges they
are assigned will not be germane to the specific issues at stake in their
cases.
The success of a disqualification regime in the brave new world of
judicial speech is by no means assured. There are three potential
impediments, at least the third of which strikes me as serious enough
to warrant rethinking the emerging new world order, of which the
disqualification regime is an integral part.
First, some critics of a disqualification regime argue that White
prohibits the state from punishing judges for taking positions on issues
that could come before them later, regardless of whether such
punishment takes the form of a flat prohibition on position taking or a
directive to disqualify in the aftermath of position taking. 8 Although
firm conclusions must await the outcome of ongoing litigation, I find
this objection uniquely unpersuasive. There is an obvious difference
between telling judges that they may not speak and telling judges that
86. See, e.g., Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp.
2d 1080, 1083-84 (D. Alaska 2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp.
2d 672, 702 (E.D. Ky. 2004); cf. Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualificationor Suppression: Due
Process and the Response to JudicialCampaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 568-70

(2004) (arguing that recusal "could be precisely targeted to preventing due process
problems .... without restricting campaign speech at all.").
87. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(e) (2000).
88. See, e.g., Matthew J. Medina, Note, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to
Canon 3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1072 (2004)
(arguing that White supports the position that a provision in a state's Code of Judicial
Conduct restricting statements by candidates regarding disputed legal and political issues is
unconstitutional).
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they may speak, but may need to take corrective action later if their
prior speech deprives litigants of a fair forum. Moreover,
disqualification is not punitive." The judge who must disqualify
herself for making public, extrajudicial statements that call her
impartiality into question is not being "punished" any more than the
judge who must disqualify herself from a case in which her son
appears as counsel or in which she owns stock in one of the corporate
parties is being "punished" for having children or making financial
investments.
Second, if judges are encouraged to abandon the older, good
government paradigm in which they were ever mindful of appearances
and kept their views on issues of the day to themselves in favor of the
newer civil liberties paradigm in which judges are invited to trumpet
their views and biases for the edification of litigants and voters, one
might predict the advent of mass-disqualification. The specter of
outspoken judges taking public positions on all conceivable issues of
the day, thereby calling into question their impartiality to decide
everything, forcing recusals en masse, and driving the administration
of justice to its knees, is frightening to contemplate in the abstract but
unlikely to materialize. Time and again, when disqualification rules
have collided with the needs of judicial administration, the former
have yielded to the latter. Thus, the "rule of necessity" has trumped
disqualification rules when all available judges would otherwise be
disqualified;' small town trial judges have disqualified themselves less
frequently than their urban counterparts when confronted with
litigants whom they know personally, given the practical need for
rural judges to administer justice in smaller communities where judges
often know the parties who come before them; 9' and Supreme Court
justices have sometimes expressed reluctance to disqualify themselves
given the practical need to avoid decisional stalemates by an equally
divided court.'
The third impediment to the success of a disqualification regime
follows unavoidably from rejection of the second: if judges embrace
89. See generally Annotation, Interest of Judge in an Official or Representative
Capacity, or Relationship of Judge to One Who Is a Party in an Official or Representative
Capacity,as Disqualifcation,10 A.L.R. 1307 (1959) (discussing what is required for judicial
disqualifications).
90. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 84 (2006).
91. See Maria Greenstein, Ethical Relativity, 41 JUDGES' J., 38, 39 (2002).
92. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colom., 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004)
(Scalia, J., mem.) (noting that with one justice disqualified, "[t]he Court proceeds with
eight justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to
resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case.").
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the new civil liberties paradigm and become extrajudicial pundits on
legal issues, but are loath to compromise the efficient administration
of the courts by disqualifying themselves en masse when the issues
upon which they have previously opined and apparently committed
themselves come before their courts later, their only recourse will be
to revisit and dilute the disqualification standards. In other words, the
circumstances under which a judge will "appear" to have committed
herself with respect to an issue in a future proceeding (thereby
necessitating disqualification) will be construed narrowly enough to
accommodate the brave new world of judicial speech without
compromising judicial administration. The net effect will be the
arrival of what I have characterized as "partial impartiality,"9 3 in which
relaxed disqualification standards foster rather than ameliorate
appearance problems by authorizing outspoken judges to decide cases
involving issues upon which they have previously spoken and, in the
public (if not the judicial) mind, apparently committed themselves.
V. REVITALIZING THE GOOD GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT

The problem lies not with a disqualification regime for judges
who exercise their right to publicly announce their views in ways that
appear to compromise their impartiality; the problem lies with the
potential emergence of a new world order that conceptualizes public
position taking by judges and judicial candidates as an unqualified
good. To avert the advent of partial impartiality, we should return to
the origins of the good government movement that Roscoe Pound
launched a century ago. White tells us that judges have a constitutional
right to take positions on issues that come before them later, but
having a right to take positions does not necessarily mean that
exercising such a right is prudent. Pound's good government
movement operated from the premise that judges should seek to
promote public confidence in the judiciary, regardless of whether they
have a "right" to do otherwise. Thus, even if judges have a
constitutional right to bellow their biases from every hilltop, the goodgovernment judge does not seek to celebrate his prejudices or to
immortalize them in the media but struggles to minimize them so as to
remain as impartial as possible and thereby preserve public
confidence in judges and the courts.
Even if we are ultimately told that the First Amendment bars
thirty-year-old codes of judicial conduct from disciplining judges for
93.

Geyh, supra note 26, at 35.
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various forms of speech or association, it bears emphasis that the
informal norms guiding Pound's good government movement have
been in place for over a century-long before the first enforceable
code of conduct was adopted. Those informal norms can and should
continue to counsel judges to think twice before they speak out in
ways that undermine their apparent impartiality.
Judges can and should demur to voters or interest groups who
pressure judges to take firm positions on issues that will come before
the judges later by referring to Pound's public trust and confidence
objectives and the emerging disqualification regime. Thus, judges
confronted with questionnaires or media inquiries soliciting implicit
commitments on specific issues that will arise in litigation should
explain why acquiescing to such demands would diminish public
confidence in their impartiality and why the only appropriate remedy
in such an event would be to disqualify themselves when the issue
arose later. In other words, they should explain why announcing their
views is not always right to do, even if it is something they have a right
to do. If the judiciary as a whole continues to adhere to the norms that
have guided its judges for over a century, isolated outlier judges who
exercise their right to deviate from those norms by taking public
positions that appear to commit them to deciding future cases in
particular ways can be disqualified later without creating pressure to
dilute disqualification standards as a means to avert mass-recusal.

